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Introduction
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE section
1031(a), gains and losses resulting from certain exchanges of
property are not recognized.' In enacting section 1031 and its pred-
ecessors, Congress provided relief to taxpayers from the general
rule that gain or loss will be realized and recognized upon an ex-
change or other disposition of property.2 In 1934, when repeal of
this nonrecognition provision was considered, Congress cited two
reasons for the retention of the rule. ,First, Congress recognized
1. Section 1031(a)(1) provides that "[njo gain or loss shall be recognized on the ex-
change of property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such
property is exchanged solely for property of like kind which is to be held either for produc-
tive use in a trade or business or for investment." I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1985).
2. See id. § 1001.
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that a "severe handicap" might be placed "upon legitimate ex-
changes" were Congress to eliminate the nonrecognition rule.3 Tax-
payers entering into exchanges might in fact realize a paper gain
but would not have any cash with which to pay the tax upon that
gain.4
The second reason cited by the House report was administra-
tive convenience which, in light of the economic conditions in the
early 1930's, also reflected fiscal policy.' These reasons for retain-
ing the nonrecognition rule of section 1031 have subsequently been
viewed by the courts as providing a statement of the congressional
purpose underlying that section. The first reason, particularly, has
been emphasized by the courts in applying section 1031.6
Although clearly reflecting a pro-investment congressional
posture, section 1031 provides relief under limited circumstances.
Only property which the taxpayer "held" for investment or for
productive use in the trade or business (the "holding" require-
ment) is subject to the nonrecognition rule of section 1031 and
then only if that property is exchanged for "like-kind" property-
(the "like-kind" requirement) "to be held" by the taxpayer for in-,
vestment or for productive use in the taxpayer's trade or business!
(the "to be held" requirement).7 In addition, certain classes of
property can never be the subject of an exchange qualifying for
section 1031 treatment.' These limitations on the nonrecognition
rule of section 1031 have been termed harsh, inequitable, and illog-
ical.' In fact, they may be. Nonetheless, they represent Congress'
effort to assure that nonrecognition is accorded only where there is
a continuing investment.
Continuity of investment is a standard not unfamiliar to tax
practitioners. Indeed, continuity of investment justifies the nonrec-
ognition generally accorded the transfer of assets to a corporation
3. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 63-64 (1978).
7. I.R.C. § 1031 (1985).
8. Internal Revenue Code section 1031(a)(2) provides that section 1031(a)(1) shall not
apply to any exchange of stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale; to stock,
bonds, or notes; to other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest; to interests in a
partnership; to certificates of trust or beneficial interest; or to choses in action. Id. §
1031(a)(2).
9. Willis, Of Impermissible Illogic and Section 1031, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 72, 77 (1981).
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or partnership, 10 the transfer of assets or stock in corporate reorga-
nizations,1 the rollover of basis on the transfer and purchase of a
personal residence, 2 and even the receipt of insurance proceeds in
the case of an involuntary conversion.' 3 In a manner different from
any of the code provisions relevant to these situations, however,
section 1031 defines the continuity of investment necessary to trig-
ger nonrecognition in the exchange context. Specifically, the tax-
payer must satisfy the "like-kind" requirement and the two hold-
ing requirements with respect to the property exchanged and the
property received in the exchange.' 4 The following hypotheticals
demonstrate the difference between the continuity of investment
standard found in section 1031 and that standard as reflected in
other code sections.
Hypothetical 1:
Taxpayer A, who owns an airplane which he has used in a
charter aircraft business, is approached by a group of real estate
investors who are anxious to form a real estate development corpo-
ration. A agrees to contribute his airplane to the enterprise and the
others agree to contribute real estate. A and the real estate inves-
tors will each receive half of the stock of the newly formed corpo-
ration. A's contribution to the corporation in exchange for stock
will not trigger the recognition of any gain (or loss) as provided by
section 351.1' If, however, A, instead of contributing the plane to a
corporation, were to transfer a one-half interest in his plane di-
rectly to the investors in exchange for a one-half interest in the
real estate held by them, the gain or loss on this exchange would
be recognized because A would have failed to satisfy the "like-
kind" test of section 1031. Thus, even though A held the plane for
investment and will hold for investment the real estate received in
10. I.R.C. §§ 351, 721 (1985).
11. Id. §§ 354, 361.
12. Id. § 1034.
13. Id. § 1033.
14. See supra note 1.
15. As part of the continuity of investment requirement under the nonrecognition rule
of Internal Revenue Code section 351, the person or persons contributing property to a
corporation must be in control of the corporation immediately after the exchange. I.R.C. §
351 (1985). Internal Revenue Code section 368(c) defines control. See id. § 368(c) (1985).
Section 1031 contains no such control requirement.
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the exchange and even though any gain or loss is realized only on
paper, section 1031 is inapplicable.
A's position in the latter scenario is not much different from
A's position in the former. In both cases A after the transaction
effectively owns a one-half interest in both the airplane and the
real estate. Section 351, however, provides nonrecognition despite
the dissimilarity between the airplane and the property repre-
sented by the stock. That dissimilarity negates nonrecognition for
section 1031 purposes. In other words, for section 351 purposes
there is continuity of interest; for section 1031 purposes there is
not.
Hypothetical 2:
Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 1 except that A has
used the plane only for personal purposes. In the first scenario in
Hypothetical 1, A would still be entitled to nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 351, which imposes no holding requirement
comparable to section 1031. Continuity of investment exists for
section 351 purposes. By comparison, if A were to exchange the
airplane for like-kind property such as another airplane, which A
intended to hold for investment, A would not be entitled to non-
recognition under section 1031. In the case of the exchange, A has
failed to satisfy the section 1031 "holding" requirement relating to
the property given in the exchange. Again, for section 1031 pur-
poses, there is no continuity of interest.
As these hypotheticals demonstrate, the continuity of invest-
ment standards of section 1031 - the "like-kind," "holding," and
"to be held" requirements - are unique. Although they may pro-
duce results that are inconsistent and harsh, any taxpayer seeking
to take advantage of the nonrecognition benefits of section 1031
must nevertheless satisfy these specific standards.
Of the three prongs of the continuity of investment standard
of section 1031, the "holding" and "to be held" requirements have
received the least attention from the Treasury, the courts, and the
commentators. Although Treasury regulations set out several ex-
amples of "like-kind" property,16 they make no effort to define the
"holding" and "to be held" requirements of section 1031. More
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c), T.D. 6935, 32 F.R. 15822.
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often implicitly than explicitly, however, the courts and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("Service") have provided their interpretation
of these requirements. What emerges from the scant authority on
these requirements is that there is considerable confusion as to the
precise nature of the "holding" and the "to be held" requirements.
The recent decisions of the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit in
Magneson v. Commissioner17 and Bolker v. Commissioner18 both
expanded the boundaries of qualified holding and reemphasized
the need for guidance from the Treasury or Congress on these is-
sues. This Article will examine the judicial and administrative de-
velopment of the two holding requirements prior to Magneson and
Bolker and the subsequent impact of these decisions. The Article
will then suggest a standard to be followed in the future.
I. THE HOLDING REQUIREMENTS-PRE-
BOLKER AND MAGNESON
Prior to Bolker and Magneson, suprisingly little authority ex-
isted with respect to either the "holding" requirement or the "to
be held" requirement. The existing authority, however, suggested
the kinds of factors which are relevant to a determination of
whether a taxpayer has satisfied the requirements. For purposes of
discussing the factors relevant to the holding requirements, this
Article will examine each requirement separately.
A. The "Holding" Requirement
The two factors which apparently are most relevant to the de-
termination of whether a taxpayer has "held" the exchanged prop-
erty for the requisite purposes are, first, the taxpayer's subjective
intent and, second, the length of time that the taxpayer has used
the property for investment or trade or business purposes.
1. Role of Subjective Intent
Consistent with use of the term "held" in other code sections,
the taxpayer's subjective intent plays a significant role in deter-
mining whether, for section 1031 purposes, the taxpayer has "held"
the exchanged property for productive use in the trade or business
17. 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C. 767 (1983).
18. 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), af'g 81 T.C. 782 (1983).
Winter 19861
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or for investment.19 Indeed, the very language of section 1031 sug-
gests the importance of subjective intent. Section 1031 does not
require that the taxpayer establish actual use of the property in
the trade or business; it is sufficient if the taxpayer, prior to the
exchange, merely held the property for the purpose of someday us-
ing it in the trade or business.20 Similarly, section 1031 applies to
property "held .. . for investment."'2' The importance of one's
purpose or intent in holding the property is obvious.
The Service has implicitly recognized the importance of sub-
jective intent in a number of revenue rulings. In Revenue Ruling
57-244,22 for example, the taxpayer purchased real estate for pur-
poses of constructing his residence thereon .2 Almost immediately
after acquiring the real estate, the taxpayer abandoned that pur-
pose and held the property for investment only. 4 Five years later,
the taxpayer exchanged this real estate for other real estate which
he held for investment. 25 Although the Service did not discuss the
"holding" requirement explicitly, the conclusion that section 1031
was applicable necessarily indicates that the Service considered the
"holding" requirement satisfied. Subjective intent is thus relevant
to the "holding" requirement and must be determined on the facts
of each case. As indicated by the ruling, a taxpayer's intent may
change. Thus, one's initial holding of property for personal pur-
poses will not negate the taxpayer's right to claim the benefits of
section 1031 with respect to a later like-kind exchange if the tax-
payer's purpose in holding the property in the period immediately
preceding the exchange coincides with the purposes required by
section 1031.
A prearranged exchange of property held by a taxpayer often
establishes that the taxpayer lacks the intent needed to satisfy the
"holding" requirement. In three often cited rulings, the Service has
ruled that a prearranged exchange of property following its acqui-
sition will not qualify for section 1031 treatment. In Revenue Rul-
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1221(2), 1231(b) (1985).
20. By contrast, one should note that property subject to the characterization rule of
section 1231 is "property used in the trade or business." See id. § 1231.
21. Id. § 1031; see supra note 1 for text.
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ing 75-291,2o the taxpayer Y wanted certain land and a factory
owned by X.27 X agreed to transfer this property to Y if Y would
acquire specific land, build a factory thereon (apparently to X's
specifications), and then transfer the land and new factory to X. Y
acquired the land, built the factory, and then consumated the ex-
change with X.28 Although Y necessarily held the property given to
X for some period of time, the holding of the property was neither
for investment purposes nor for productive use in trade or busi-
ness.29 The Service appropriately concluded that Y was not enti-
tled to nonrecognition under section 1031.0
Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 77-297,' A agreed to sell his
ranch to B provided that B cooperate with A in making an ex-
change of properties should A find suitable like-kind property.2 A
located a ranch owned by C.33 B purchased C's ranch and immedi-
ately exchanged it for the ranch owned by A.3 4 The Service held
that A qualified for section 1031 treatment. B, however, did not
qualify because B had not held C's ranch for business use or in-
vestment.3 5 The ruling cited Revenue Ruling 75-291 for the princi-
ple that section 1031 does "not apply to a taxpayer who acquires
property solely for the purpose of exchanging it for like-kind prop-
erty. ''3 6 Presumably, as in Revenue Ruling 77-297, many exchanges
do not involve a gain or loss realized, and as a result, the taxpayer
will have no reason to be concerned with the application of section
1031.
Revenue Ruling 77-33717 presented a prearrangement in a sig-
nificantly different context. Taxpayer A was the sole owner of cor-
poration X which owned a shopping center.3 8 A liquidated X under









35. Id. at 305.
36. Id. The ruling also noted that no gain or loss had been realized in any case, even
though the exchange was a taxable one because B's cost basis in the property given up
equalled B's amount realized on the exchange. Id.
37. Rev. Rul. 337, 1977-2 C.B. 305.
38. Id.
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section 333, thereby acquiring direct ownership of the center.8 9
"Immediately following the liquidation, in a prearranged plan, A
transferred the shopping center in exchange for property of a like-
kind owned by B, an unrelated party."' 0 The revenue ruling held
that A could not qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition because
the "productive use of the shopping center by X prior to the liqui-
dation cannot be attributed to A. ''41 Without such attribution, A's
holding became no different from that of corporation Y in Revenue
Ruling 75-291 and individual B in Revenue Ruling 77-297. The
shopping center had been "acquired" by A solely for purposes of
making the exchange, and that purpose is not the purpose ex-
pressly required by section 1031(a).
These rulings, though not expressly discussing intent, demon-
strate the importance of the taxpayer's intent with respect to the
"holding" requirement. As indicated, the circumstances surround-
ing the exchange and the specific actions of the taxpayer with re-
spect to the property prior to its exchange will be considered
highly probative of the intent of the taxpayer in holding the
property.
In contrast, the Tax Court in one memorandum opinion has
indicated that intent may not always play a significant role in the
determination of whether the taxpayer satisfied the holding re-
quirement. In Rutherford v. Commissioner,42 the Tax Court sug-
gested that the prearranged exchange of acquired property will not
negate the application of section 1031.41 There, the taxpayer re-
ceived twelve half-blood heifers from another party, agreeing to
breed them with a registered bull and to deliver to the other party
the first twelve three-quarter-blood heifers in return." The issue
was the taxpayer's basis in the half-blood heifers he had received.45
The court agreed with the Commissioner that the taxpayer had no
basis in the half-blood heifers but "for a different reason than ad-
vanced by him on brief."' "4 The court determined, apparently on its
39. Id. See I.R.C. § 333 (1985).
40. Rev. Rul. 337, 1977-2 C.B. 305.
41. Id. at 306.
42. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77 (1978).
43. Id. at 1851-79.
44. Id. at 1851-77 to -78.
45. Id. at 1851-78 to -79.
46. Id. at 1851-78.
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own motion, that section 1031 applied to the exchange, that the
taxpayer's basis in the property received (the half-blood heifers)
thus depended on the basis in the property given up (the subse-
quently born three-quarter blood heifers), and that his basis in the
latter (the taxpayer having deducted all of their expenses) was
zero.47 The fact that the three-quarter blood heifers were not in
existence at the time the half-blood heifers were received did not
take the exchange out of section 1031 "at least under the circum-
stances of this case." '48 The court never addressed the holding re-
quirement issue - whether the three-quarter blood heifers given up
by the taxpayer could be said to be held for investment or business
use when they were, from birth, subject to the agreement to deliver
them as part of the exchange to another.
The result in Rutherford is troubling. The decision is devoid
of any analysis of the "holding" requirement; the court merely as-
sumed the requirement was satisfied. In light of the above revenue
rulings and considering the purpose and the specific language of
section 1031, the court's opinion seems ill-conceived. Given that
the court apparently raised section 1031 on its own and given the
corresponding lack of analysis of the "holding" requirement, one
would normally dismiss the opinion as being of little import. As
developed below, however, the taxpayer in Bolker would find
Rutherford to be useful. 49
2. Length of Time Property is Held Prior to the Exchange
Section 1031 imposes no time requirement on the holding re-
quired of property to be exchanged. Time, however, is a considera-
tion inherent in the phrase "held for productive use in the trade or
business or for investment." It seems doubtful Congress intended
that nonrecognition treatment be accorded an exchange of prop-
erty when the property given by the taxpayer was held for the req-
uisite purpose but only for a short period of time. Indeed, a short
term holding period may provide strong proof of a lack of intent to
hold property for the required purposes of section 1031. As dis-
cussed below, case law addressing the "to be held" requirement of
section 1031 suggests the importance of the length of the post-ex-
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See infra text accompanying note 134.
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change holding as a factor in determining taxpayer intent regard-
ing the property received in the exchange.5 0 In addition to the mat-
ter of intent, the time or history of holding also appears relevant to
the "holding" requirement given the congressional purpose in ac-
cording nonrecognition to like-kind exchanges. As noted previ-
ously, Congress was concerned~about the harshness which could re-
sult if taxpayers were forced to recognize paper gains realized when
one investment was exchanged for another like-kind investment.5
Presumably, the gains or losses of primary concern to Congress
were those which had accrued over a period of time while a tax-
payer held property for use in the trade or business or for invest-
ment, not the gains or losses accruing either while a taxpayer held
the property for some other purpose or while someone other than
the taxpayer held the property.
A brief example illustrates this point. Assume that X held
property for personal purposes for five years during which time the
property substantially appreciated. After the five year period, X
used the property in his trade or business for one day and then
exchanged the property for like-kind property to be held for use in
the trade or business. Little if any of the gain realized by X on the
exchange is likely to be attributable to the one day period when X
held the property for business use. The gain attributable to the
period of personal use of the property was not the focus of Con-
gress' concern in enacting section 1031.52 If there is some gain asso-
ciated with the day X held the property for business purposes,
that one day's gain is not what Congress sought to shelter through
the nonrecognition rule of section 1031. Gain accruing over some
longer period of business or investment related holding must have
been the subject of congressional concern.
If time is a relevant factor in determining whether a taxpayer
has satisfied the holding requirement, what time period is suffi-
cient? Although there is no authority specifically requiring a par-
ticular minimum period of time during which property must be
held before its exchange will justify nonrecognition under section
1031, existing authorities do provide some limited guidance. In
Wagensen v. Commissioner,"3 the Service argued that the transi-
50. See infra text accompanying notes 72-79.
51. See supra text preceding note 4.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
53. 74 T.C. 653 (1980).
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tory holding of property received in an exchange was insufficient to
satisfy the "to be held" requirements of section 1031. 5" The tax-
payer had exchanged a portion of his ranch for like-kind property.
Less than ten months thereafter, the taxpayer gave the like-kind
property to his children. Although the taxpayer, prior to the ex-
change, had contemplated giving his ranch to his children, there
was no evidence of any existing gift plan when the exchange was
consumated.5 5 The facts indicated instead that the taxpayer in-
tended to use the lands received in the exchange in his ranching
business. Despite the Service's argument that the taxpayer had not
satisfied the "to be held" requirement, the court concluded that
the taxpayer's holding of the property for more than nine months
and the use of the property in the taxpayer's business during that
time was sufficient to demonstrate that the taxpayer was holding
the property for productive use in his business.5 6 Thus, although
Wagensen addresses the "to be held" requirement, the opinion
nonetheless suggests that nine months is a sufficient period to sat-
isfy the "holding" requirement.
Another case applying the "to be held" standard is also rele-
vant to the determination of the time frame necessary to satisfy
the "holding" requirement. In Regals Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner,57 a taxpayer corporation determined that a sale of certain
commercial property was not advantageous and exchanged that
property for other commercial property.5 8 The corporation's board
of directors met less than two weeks later and decided to liquidate
the corporation, sell the property acquired in the exchange, and
distribute the proceeds of the sale to the shareholders. Instead of
selling the property, however, the corporation, as part of its liqui-
dation, transferred the property to a new corporation in exchange
for stock of that corporation and then distributed the stock to the
taxpayer's shareholders. The court held that section 1031 did not
apply. The fact that the taxpayer, within two weeks of the ex-
change, had transferred the property received in the exchange to a
54. Id. at 657.
55. Id. at 659.
56. Id.
57. 43 B.T.A. 194 (1940), aff'd, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942).
58. Id. at 209.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 211.
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new corporation was apparently critical in the court's determina-
tion that the taxpayer had not satisfied the "to be held" require-
ment. e' Without stating so expressly, the court must have treated
the two week period as inadequate to satisfy the holding require-
ment because all other requirements for section 1031 nonrecogni-
tion treatment were met.
The relevance of length of time as a factor in determining
whether a taxpayer has satisfied the holding requirement is not en-
tirely certain, however, as the Tax Court memorandum decision in
Rutherford demonstrated. The Rutherford court apparently ac-
cepted a very short term holding period - the two or three month
period from the birth of the calves to the time they were weaned -
as satisfying the "holding" requirement.62
As indicated by the above discussion of subjective intent and
the length of time that property is held, the courts and the Service
have generally not been very precise in applying the language of
section 1031 to particular fact patterns. This failure to address and
delineate clearly the relevant factors has generated confusion and,
as Rutherford demonstrates, poor analysis and questionable
results.
B. The "To Be Held" Requirement
1. Role of Subjective Intent
Although subjective intent is an important factor in determin-
ing whether a taxpayer has satisfied the "holding" requirement, it
appears to be the determinative factor with respect to whether a
taxpayer has satisfied the "to be held" requirement. Regals pro-
vides a thorough interpretation of the "to be held" requirement
and emphasizes the importance of intent.63 Regarding section
1031(a)'s "to be held" language, the Tax Court commented:
This in our view imports the existence of an intent or mental
condition on the part of the holder; so that for our decision to
be favorable to petitioner we must be satisfied that its mental
state was such that it intended to hold the property received as
61. Id. at 209.
62. Rutherford v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77 (1978). Calves are generally
weaned from their mothers within a few months after birth.
63. Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 194 (1940), af'd, 127 F.2d 931 (2d
Cir. 1942).
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an investment. Such a motive would in itself be inconsistent
with a finding that the real intention of the taxpayer had been
to arrange an outright sale of property for cash, but that for
tax purposes it had been compelled to create the appearance of
a tax-free exchange. For, if the latter is the case, an intention
to sell the substituted property for cash as soon as possible in
order to achieve the final result originally desired would be
more consistent with the underlying purpose than that the new
property was also an investment venture.6 4
The corporation in Regals, prior to exchanging its commercial
property, contemplated a cash sale of that property. The potential
tax impact of a cash sale, however, caused the corporation to ex-
change the property primarily for other commercial property. In
view of the corporation's initial desire to sell its property for cash,
a corporate resolution authorizing the almost immediate sale of the
property received in exchange, and the fact that the property was
transferred to a new corporation, the Tax Court concluded that the
taxpayer was holding the latter property for sale and not for the
purposes set forth in section 1031.65 In light of the tax motivations
that impelled the transaction, the Second Circuit concluded that
"the intention to hold for a sufficient time to reduce taxes, and no
longer, does not satisfy the statutory test."" The court stressed
that the taxpayer must acquire the property for investment or pro-
ductive use, "rather than . . . for inventory, sale or similar
purposes. ' 67
Regals thus teaches a dual lesson regarding the intent require-
ment implicit in the "to be held" standard of section 1031. First,
the taxpayer's intent at the time of the exchange is determinative
and a taxpayer's intent "to sell," at least for cash, is inconsistent
with an intent to hold for business use or investment. Second, the
taxpayer's actions immediately prior and subsequent to the ex-
change are relevant in determining whether the taxpayer had the
requisite intent at the time of the exchange. The lesson of Regals
is reflected in Revenue Ruling 75-292," in which taxpayer A, an
individual, transferred business land and buildings to corporation
64. Id. at 208-09.
65. Id.
66. Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 931, 934 (2d Cir. 1942).
67. Id.
68. Rev. Rul. 292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
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W for land and an office building.69 As part of a prearranged trans-
action, A immediately transferred the newly-acquired like-kind
property to corporation Y in exchange for Y stock. Y had been cre-
ated by A and the transaction with Y qualified as a nonrecognition
exchange under section 351 of the code. The issue concerning A
was whether the exchange with W qualified under section 1031. 70
The ruling held that it did not, stating simply that the property
received from W was not held either for productive use or for in-
vestment because "[t]he property he received from W was to be
transferred to Y and was not to be held by A."'71
2. Significance of Holding Period and Prearrangements
As Regals indicates, one of the factors relevant to the determi-
nation of a taxpayer's intent at the time of the exchange is the
period of time following the exchange when the taxpayer uses the
acquired property for business or investment purposes. With re-
spect to the "holding" requirement, the period of holding is proba-
tive of intent and is also apparently a factor to be considered apart
from intent. With respect to the "to be held" requirement, how-
ever, the holding period appears significant only as a factor proba-
tive of intent. The language of section 1031, however, requires no
history of holding with respect to the property acquired in the ex-
change but only an intent that the property, following the ex-
change, be held for one of the requisite purposes.
Two Tax Court cases, Wagensen v. Commissioner7 and Click
v. Commissioner,7" demonstrate the limited role of the holding pe-
riod. In Wagensen, the taxpayer held and used in his business the
acquired property for over nine months before giving the property
to his children.7 4 Although the taxpayer, prior to the exchange, had
contemplated giving his ranch properties to his children, he had no
"concrete plans" to do so at the time of the exchange.78 The tax-
payer's holding and use of the acquired property for nine months
following the exchange suggested that the taxpayer, at the time of
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 334.
72. 74 T.C. 653 (1980). See supra note 53-56 and accompanying text.
73. 78 T.C. 225 (1982).
74. Wagenson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653, 658 (1980).
75. Id. at 659.
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the exchange, intended to hold the property for the requisite pur-
poses. Wagensen thus teaches that the longer that one holds prop-
erty following an exchange the greater the likelihood of establish-
ing the requisite intent at the time of the exchange.
Click, however, suggests that the mere holding of property for
a long period of time following an exchange is not dispositive.76 In
Click, a taxpayer received certain residential property in exchange
for a tract of farmland. The property received by the taxpayer was
property which the taxpayer's children had located when the tax-
payer suggested they look for suitable property to "swap" for the
farmland. 7 Almost immediately after the exchange, the children
and their spouses occupied the residential property received in the
exchange, and insured, improved, and paid taxes on it. Approxi-
mately seven months after the exchange, the taxpayer gave the res-
idential property to her children. The Tax Court concluded that
Click acquired the residences in order to give them away and not
to hold them for investment. 78 The mere fact that the taxpayer
had held title to the property for seven months following the ex-
change was insufficient to establish that the taxpayer acquired the
property intending to hold it for investment.79
Wagensen and Click also demonstrate, as in the case of the
"holding" requirement, that prearrangements may undermine a
taxpayer's efforts to meet the "to be held" requirement. In Wagen-
sen there was no prearrangement or "concrete plan" to dispose of
the ranch after receiving it in the exchange. There was evidence
that the taxpayer, who was in his seventies, had discussed the pos-
sibility of transferring property to his children. The Tax Court
found that he had had at the time of the exchange the "general
desire .. .eventually to transfer his property to his children."80
The Tax Court, although agreeing that an intent at the time of the
exchange to give the property away would disqualify the exchange
for section 1031 treatment, reasoned that a "general desire" to
76. Click v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 225 (1982).
77. Id. at 233.
78. Id. at 234.
79. The Commissioner distinguished Wagensen on the facts-Click had "concrete
plans" at the time of the exchange-and on the nature of the property-the ranch in
Wagensen was "inherently investment or business property while the houses received herein
were personal." Id. 232 & n.3.
80. Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653, 659 (1980).
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transfer "eventually" one's property (presumably this general de-
sire existed with respect to the property received in the exchange)
was not inconsistent with a present investment or business mo-
tive."' The court found as a factual matter from other evidence
that a business motive existed and that the taxpayer had "no con-
crete plans" to make the gift at the time of the exchange.2
Click, by contrast, provides an example of a case in which the
court was satisfied that the eventual gift of the properties received
by the taxpayer in the exchange was prearranged; the taxpayer had
''concrete plans" at the time of the exchange to give the acquired
residential property to her children, a prearrangement which pre-
vented satisfaction of the "to be held" requirement. 3 Thus, not
surprisingly, a prearranged disposition of property acquired in an
exchange will likely negate section 1031 nonrecognition treatment.
3. Change in Motive after Acquisition
Click reiterated the proposition that the taxpayer's intent to
hold property for investment must be determined at the time of
the exchange and cited two memorandum decisions, Land Dynam-
ics v. Commissioner8 4 and Klarkowski v. Commissioner,5 appar-
ently for the proposition that a change in motive after acquisition
will not satisfy the statute.86 In Land Dynamics, the taxpayer, a
dealer in land, acquired certain grassland in exchange for an or-
ange grove.87 The grassland was offered for sale and sold approxi-
mately two years after its acquisition. Finding no evidence that the
land dealer was an investor with respect to this property, the court
held that the grassland exchange failed to meet section 1031(a) re-
quirements because the property was held primarily for sale. 8
81. Id.
82. The other evidence included an active search for additional properties for some
months following the exchange, and actual business use by the taxpayer of the ranch ac-
quired in the exchange. The court also appeared to attach weight to the facts that the tax-
payer did not articulate his general desire to his accountant, by discussing the tax implica-
tions of his ultimate gifts, until some unspecified time after acquiring the ranch. Id.
83. Click v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 225, 233 (1982).
84. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (1978).
85. 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1827 (1965).
86. The taxpayer in Click, however, appeared to argue an initial investment intent
rather than a change to one after acquisition. Click v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 225, 231
(1980).
87. Land Dynamics v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119, 1121 (1978).
88. Id. at 1121.
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There was no discussion of a possible change of intent.
This issue was briefly addressed in Klarkowski. The taxpayer
in question, Richard Thomas, exchanged income-producing com-
mercial property for sixty-six acres of vacant land.89 The property
given up was owned by Thomas although title was held by a trust
of which Thomas was the sole beneficiary. The acreage received in
the exchange was apparently acquired by Thomas individually and
transferred to a trust, though the fact was not entirely clear. All of
the parties and the court treated Thomas as acquiring a one hun-
dred percent interest in the sixty-six acres in exchange for the
property given up.90 Prior to the exchange, Thomas and two others
had formed a joint venture to acquire the acreage, with the
purchase price to be equally divided and title to be held by a trust
in which each would have a one-third interest. As the court noted,
"plans apparently changed somewhat because the property was
transferred [instead] to a newly established trust. . . and Thomas
was credited with the net value of the real estate he exchanged."' 91
Each partner, however, did assume one-third of an unpaid mort-
gage and shared equally in profits, losses, and subsequent gains on
the later sale of a two-thirds interest. In 1959, four to seven
months after the acquisition of the sixty-six acres, Thomas and his
fellow joint venturers acquired an adjoining ninety-four acres and,
at the same time, entered an agreement to sell the sixty-six acres,
an agreement subsequently cancelled. One year later, the trust sold
a two-thirds interest in the now combined 160 acres by selling the
acreage to a new trust in which the initial joint venturers held only
a one-third interest. Finally, in 1964, six years after Thomas' initial
agreement to acquire the sixty-six acres, the new trust disposed of
the entire 160 acres.
Thomas argued that the initial exchange of commercial prop-
erty for sixty-six acres of land satisfied section 1031 because the
latter was acquired primarily for investment purposes and was in
fact held for six years after the exchange.92 The court did not dis-
cuss any holding issues with respect to the interests of the trusts or
the partnership at the time of the exchange.9 It decided simply
89. Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1827, 1841 (1965).
90. Id. at. 1841-43.
91. Id. at 1842.
92. Id. at 1843.
93. The partnership holding issue was central to Magneson. See infra notes 193-201
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that Thomas had not carried his burden of proof regarding the ac-
quisition, stating that the:
critical point of time here is the time when the exchange took
place. While a taxpayer's purpose in holding property may
change so the nature or character of the property for tax pur-
poses may be different at the time of sale than its nature or
character at the time it was acquired, under this statute we
think the purpose for which the property was acquired is of
major importance.""
The court concluded that Thomas' intent at the time of the ex-
change, his subsequent change of motive notwithstanding, was to
liquidate his investment in real estate and that he thus held the
sixty-six acres primarily for sale. 5
In sum, a taxpayer's intent is the key factor in determining
whether the "to be held" requirement has been satisfied. It is the
taxpayer's intent at the time of the exchange that is critical;
changes in motive subsequent to the exchange will not affect the
determination of whether section 1031 is applicable. As Wagensen
and Click demonstrated, the length of the taxpayer's holding of
the acquired property subsequent to the exchange, as well as any
prearrangements regarding the disposition of the property, are rel-
evant in determining the taxpayer's intent regarding the property
acquired in the exchange.
C. Attribution
A question relevant to both the "holding" requirement and
the "to be held" requirement is whether a holding by an entity
related to the taxpayer will be attributed to the taxpayer. If a cor-
poration distributes property to a shareholder during liquidation
and the shareholder immediately thereafter exchanges the prop-
erty received, will the holding of the property by the corporation
prior to liquidation be deemed a holding by the taxpayer sufficient
to satisfy the "holding" requirement of section 1031? If a taxpayer
enters into an exchange and immediately thereafter transfers the
property received in the exchange to a corporation or a partner-
ship, will the holding by the corporation or partnership be deemed
and accompanying text.
94. Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1827, 1842 (1965).
95. Id. at 1843.
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a holding by the taxpayer which will satisfy the "to be held" re-
quirement of section 1031? Prior to Magnesen and Bolker, both of
which specifically raised these questions,9 there was scant author-
ity on this issue. The existing authority does suggest that attribu-
tion is not appropriate. In Regals,9" for example, the property re-
ceived in the exchange was transferred by the taxpayer corporation
to a new corporation, stock of which was then distributed to the
taxpayer's shareholders." The taxpayer argued, in effect, there was
a tax free reorganization. The Board of Tax Appeals rejected this
argument:
It may be that this transaction was in the nature of a tax-free
reorganization. Nevertheless it was a transfer from this peti-
tioner and made it impossible for it to "hold" the property as
an investment. We think the provisions of 112(b)(1) [the fore-
runner of section 1031(a)] were intended to apply only to the
same tax-payer. We are not required to disregard the separate
corporate entities of petitioner and its successor at the behest
of their creators .... 9
The Board of Tax Appeals thus held there could not be any attri-
bution from one corporation to another. The quoted language also
suggests that the court would have found there could be no attri-
bution from a partnership or a corporation to a partner or share-
holder or vice-versa.
Revenue Ruling 77-337,100 discussed previously, rejected the
attribution of holding from one taxpayer to a related taxpayer.
10 1
In that ruling, the taxpayer receiving property in a section 333 liq-
uidation immediately exchanged the property. The ruling con-
cluded that the taxpayer was not entitled to the benefit of section
1031 because "the productive use of the [property by the corpora-
tion] prior to liquidation cannot be attributed to [the tax-
payer] .'102 Revenue Ruling 75-29210° similarly rejected attribution
96. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
97. Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 194 (1940), aff'd, 127 F.2d 931 (2d
Cir. 1942).
98. Id. at 209.
99. Id. at 210-11.
100. Rev. Rul. 237, 1977-2 C.B. 305.
101. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
102. Rev. Rul. 237, 1977-2 C.B. 305, 306.
103. Rev. Rul. 292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
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between a corporation and its shareholder."" Taxpayer A had re-
ceived business property in a like-kind exchange and had immedi-
ately contributed that property to corporation Y in a section 351
exchange.10 5 The ruling denied section 1031 treatment to A on the
initial exchange on the ground that the property received had been
held by A not for productive use or investment but only for trans-
fer to corporation to Y for Y stock.106 Implicitly, then, the ruling
denied attribution to A of corporation Y's business use of the
property in question. If I's use were attributed to A, the initial
exchange would have satisfied the section 1031 requirements.
Two other decisions suggest, however, that attribution under
certain circumstances may be possible. In 124 Front Street, Inc. v.
Commissioner,107 the taxpayer owned an option to acquire prop-
erty which Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. wanted. 08 The taxpayer
entered into an agreement with Fireman's Fund whereby the tax-
payer would acquire the option property and then either sell it to
Fireman's Fund or exchange it with Fireman's Fund for suitable
like-kind property. Fireman's Fund agreed to lend the taxpayer
the money necessary to exercise the option. The taxpayer exercised
the option and acquired title to the option property. For five
months after the exercise of the option, the taxpayer leased the
option property and paid insurance premiums on the property.
Fireman's Fund located and acquired suitable like-kind property
and, five months after the taxpayer exercised-the option, the tax-
payer and Fireman's Fund exchanged properties.
The Tax Court concluded that a valid section 1031 exchange
had occurred but did not explicitly discuss whether the underlying
property given 'up by the taxpayer had been held for investment or
had been acquired solely to be exchanged.10 9 The issue was appar-
ently not raised by the Commissioner, and the court's discussion of
the taxpayer's five month period of ownership was directed simply
to showing that the taxpayer was the "actual owner" during that
time.1 0 As the court noted, "in addition to possessing legal title, it
104. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 333.
106. Id. at 333-34.
107. 65 T.C. 6 (1975).
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id. at 13-18.
110. Id. at 16.
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appears that the 'benefits and burdens' of ownership were with the
petitioner." 1 '
Given the prearranged sale/exchange of the option property,
the taxpayer apparently could not satisfy the holding requirement
of section 1031 without establishing that the holding of the option
constituted a holding sufficient to satisfy section 1031(a). The at-
tribution implicit in 124 Front Street, however, is far different
from the attribution at issue in Revenue Ruling 77-337 or in
Regals. In 124 Front Street, the holding of property by another
party was not at issue; the attribution question was simply whether
the taxpayer's holding of the option could be viewed as the tax-
payer's holding of the underlying property. If so, then the holding
requirement of section 1031 appears to have been satisfied. If not,
then the Tax Court in 124 Front Street presumably reached a con-
clusion inconsistent with the holding requirement of section 1031
discussed previously.
In Klarkowski," 2 title to the property which the taxpayer ex-
changed was held by a trust of which the taxpayer was the sole
beneficiary. " The Tax Court assumed that the holding require-
ment of section 1031 was satisfied, and the only section 1031 ques-
tion addressed by the court was whether the "to be held" require-
ment had been satisfied. The court, in assuming that the "holding"
requirement had been met, necessarily assumed that the holding of
beneficial title by the taxpayer/beneficiary was sufficient holding
for purposes of section 1031.11"4 Thus, as in 124 Front Street,11 5 the
mere fact that the taxpayer did not have legal title to the property
did not negate the possibility of section 1031 nonrecognition." 6 Ar-
guably, attribution of the trust's holding to the taxpayer/benefi-
ciary may, like the option arrangement in 124 Front Street, be dis-
tinguishable from the fact situations presented in Revenue Ruling
77-337117 and Regals.115 Perhaps the beneficial interest of a sole
111. Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1827 (1965). See supra notes 89-95
and accompanying text.
112. Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1842.
113. Id. at 1842-43.
114. Id.
115. 124 Front Street, Inc. V. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975).
116. Id. at 13-18.
117. Rev. Rul. 337, 1977-12 C.B. 305.
118. Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 194 (1940), aff'd, 127 F.2d 931 (2d
Cir. 1942).
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beneficiary of a trust is sufficiently identical to outright ownership
of the trust property so that attribution of the trust's holding to
that beneficiary is appropriate.
II. BOLKER AND MAGNESON
The Bolker 19 and Magneson12 0 decisions have both blurred
and expanded the holding requirements of section 1031. The tax-
payer in Bolker received property in a corporate liquidation and
promptly exchanged it for other property.1 21 The taxpayers in
Magneson exchanged real property and promptly transferred the
property they received to a partnership in return for a general
partner's interest.122 In both cases, the Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit held that the property exchanges qualified for nonrecogni-
tion under section 1031. The decisions, however, have increased
the need for authoritative guidance on the holding requirements.
A. Bolker and the "Holding" Requirement
1. The Tax Court and Ninth Circuit Decisions
The taxpayer in Bolker, the sole shareholder of a corporation
owning valuable land suitable for development, determined that he
would either develop the corporation's land "into income-produc-
ing property by constructing apartments thereon or trade the...
property for other income-producing property.' ' 28 His attorneys
advised him that if the land were developed it would be preferable
for tax purposes that the land be owned outright by him rather
than by the corporation. They further advised that the property
could be removed from the corporation through a section 333 liqui-
dation without triggering any income tax liability to him. Before
119. Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782 (1982), affd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
Although it was decided after Magneson, Bolker is treated first in this Article because it
addresses the first of the two holding requirements of section 1031. Unless a taxpayer estab-
lishes satisfaction of the "holding" requirement which Bolker addressed, the "to be held"
requirement addressed in Magneson is not reached.
120. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
121. Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782, 793 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir.
1985).
122. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, 768 (1983), affd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir.
1985).
123. Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782, 788 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir.
1985).
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liquidation of the corporation began, Bolker negotiated a sale of
the property to a bank, and the liquidation of the corporation then
commenced. The corporation conveyed the property to the tax-
payer and, on the same day, Bolker, the bank, and a corporation
formed by Bolker's attorneys to facilitate the exchange entered
into a three-way exchange agreement requiring the bank to ex-
change properties suitable to Bolker or to pay him $2,550,000 for
the property. Three months later, properties satisfactory to the
taxpayer were given by the bank in exchange for the property the
taxpayer had received in liquidation of the corporation. 124
The Service challenged Bolker's attempt to get nonrecognition
treatment, contending that the exchange did not qualify as a tax-
free exchange under section 1031.125 Specifically, the Service ar-
gued that the property given up by the taxpayer had not been held
by the taxpayer for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment.12 6 The Tax Court, rejecting this argument and relying
on its reasoning in Magneson, which was decided the same day,
concluded that the taxpayer had satisfied the "holding" require-
ment of section 1031:
In Magneson, the exchange of A for B was immediately fol-
lowed by a tax-free section 721 transfer; in the instant case, the
exchange of A for B was immediately preceded by a tax-free
aquisition under section 333. That the tax-free transaction pre-
ceded rather than followed the exchange is insufficient to pro-
duce opposite results. For, as noted, section 1031's holding for
business or investment requirement is reciprocal, equally appli-
cable to properties at both ends of an exchange. Nothing in the
policy underlying section 1031 suggests that the minor varia-
tion in sequence warrants treating taxpayers dramatically
different. 127
Apart from Magneson, the court stated that the taxpayer never-
theless satisfied the holding requirement of section 1031.18 Bolker,
the court reasoned, had an economic interest in the corporate-held
land which was "essentially the same" before and after the corpo-
124. Id. at 796.
125. Id. at 804.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 805.
128. Id.
Winter 1986]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
rate liquidation except for the change in form of ownership. " Sec-
tion 333 recognizes this continuing investment and therefore gen-
erally provides that shareholders will not recognize gain upon a
liquidation but will take a basis in the property equal to their basis
in their stock, deferring gain until there is an actual liquidation of
the investment.130 In a section 333 liquidation, because the tax-
payer has not cashed in or closed out an investment, section 1031
should appropriately apply when the taxpayer exchanges that in-
vestment for a like-kind investment.1" '
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court decision but with a
considerably different rationale. 13 2 The Ninth Circuit noted that
no controlling precedent existed. 18' Two rulings relied on by the
Commissioner, Revenue Ruling 77-337 and Revenue Ruling 77-297,
were distinguishable and the two cases relied on by the taxpayer,
124 Front Street, Inc. and Rutherford, were held not to have ex-
plicitly addressed the issue.13 4 The Ninth Circuit looked to the
"plain language" of the statute for guidance. The court concluded
that giving the words "held for productive use in trade or business
or for investment" their ordinary meaning, "a taxpayer may satisfy
the 'holding' requirement by owning the property and the 'for pro-
ductive use in trade or business or for investment' requirement by
lack of intent either to liquidate the investment or to use it for
personal pursuits."'3 5 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Commis-
sioner's interpretation of the holding requirement which, according
to the court, would impose "an additional unexpressed require-
ment. . . that the taxpayer have, previous to forming the intent to
exchange one piece of property for a second parcel, an intent to
keep the first piece of property indefinitely."' ' In other words, as
long as the taxpayer owns property which he or she does not in-
tend to liquidate or to use for personal pursuits, the holding re-
quirement of section 1031 has been satisfied. "Under this formula-
tion, the intent to exchange property for like-kind property
129. Id.
130. I.R.C. §§ 333(a), (e), 334(c) (1985).
131. Bolker, 81 T.C. at 805-06.
132. Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 1043.
134. Id. at 1043-44.
135. Id. at 1045.
136. Id.
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satisfies the holding requirement, because it is not an intent to liq-
uidate the investment or to use it for personal pursuits. Bolker ac-
quired the . . . property with the intent to exchange it for like-
kind property, and thus he held [the property] for investment
under section 1031(a).' ' 7
2. Analysis
The various theories advanced by both the Tax Court and
Ninth Circuit as a basis for the conclusion that Bolker had satis-
fied the holding requirement of section 1031 are troubling. The
Tax Court's analogizing of Bolker to Magneson and the alternative
rationale it articulated in support of taxpayer's position suggest a
surprisingly broad interpretation of section 1031. The Tax Court's
opinion is flawed in several respects. First, it appears to blend into
an undifferentiated, single requirement the "holding" and the "to
be held" requirements of section 1031:
To qualify for nonrecognition under section 1031, both the
property transferred and the property received must be held
by the taxpayer either for productive use in a trade or business
or for investment .... A taxpayer's intent to hold property
for productive use in trade or business or for investment must
be determined as of the time of the exchange. 8"
The two sentences may be a colloquial summary of section 1031,
but they suggest also that the two requirements are identical.
Thus, the court not suprisingly equated Bolker, a "holding" re-
quirement case, with Magneson, a case which adressed the "to be
held" requirement, and stated: "We today ruled on a very similar
issue in Magneson v. Commissioner . . . . We believe Magneson
entitles petitioner to relief herein."' 3 There is no discussion of the
separate nature of the "holding" requirement; whether the prop-
erty at issue is the property given up or the property acquired
amounts to little more than a "minor variation.' 14 0 Reliance on
Magneson causes the Tax Court to ignore any distinction which
might usefully be made between the "holding" and "to be held"
137. Id.
138. Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782, 804 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir.
1985).
139. Id. at 804-05.
140. Id. at 805.
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requirements. As discussed previously, there is an important differ-
ence between the two requirements and the factors relevant to
their satisfaction.
141
The Tax Court's opinion is further flawed by the following
critical passage: "We believe Magneson entitles petitioner to relief
herein. In both Magneson and the instant case, property A was
exchanged for property B in a like-kind exchange, both properties
being held for business or investment as opposed to personal pur-
poses. ' 142 Seemingly blinded by Magneson, the Bolker Tax Court
appears to assume the very issue in dispute-whether "property
A," the property Bolker gave up, was in fact being held for produc-
tive or investment use. If one assumes that it was, the issue is re-
solved, for the remaining requirements of section 1031(a) were
met. The presence of a tax-free transaction before, as opposed to
after the exchange, is indeed a minor variation on a settled point if
one assumes the qualifying like-kind exchange to begin with.
The final flaw in the Tax Court's analysis is its alternative
holding which concludes that given the continuity of Bolker's in-
vestment, section 1031 nonrecognition treatment was appropriate
notwithstanding the fact that the exchange was immediately pre-
ceded by Bolker's tax free acquisition of the exchange property.14 3
As noted by the Tax Court, continuity of investment serves as the
basis for nonrecognition under section 1031. "Section 1031 is
designed to ...defer recognition of gain or loss where the 'tax-
payer has not really 'cashed in' on the theoretical gain, or closed
out a losing venture.' 144 The Tax Court emphasized that the very
nature of a section 333 liquidation, in which Bolker received the
property he subsequently exchanged, indicated the continuity of
Bolker's investment. 14 5 Section 333 provides that, under certain
circumstances, no gain will be recognized on a liquidating distribu-
tion to a shareholder.'Us Gain is deferred under section 333 to re-
flect that a shareholder, like Bolker, "continues to have an eco-
nomic interest in essentially the same investment, although there
141. See supra text accompanying notes 19-94.
142. Bolker, 81 T.C. at 805.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 806.
145. Id. at 805.
146. See I.R.C. § 333 (1985).
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has been a change in the form of ownership." 47 According to the
Tax Court, the continuity of Bolker's investment was established
by the section 333 liquidation; section 1031 nonrecognition was
therefore justified. 148
This succinct analysis suggests that the Tax Court has
adopted one of two positions, both of which are questionable. First,
the Tax Court's alternative holding may be construed as providing
that as long as the taxpayer can establish that he has not cashed in
on any theoretical gain nor closed out a losing venture, section
1031 nonrecognition treatment will be appropriate assuming the
like-kind requirement is satisfied. Under this reasoning, establish-
ing continuity of investment is the key to section 1031 treatment.
Continuity of investment under section 1031 is thus defined as
though it were the same as continuity of investment under section
333. The difficulty with this position is that it ignores the specific
language of the statute. Although section 1031 does indeed require
continuity of investment, the statutory language specifically de-
fines continuity of investment by reference to the "holding," "to be
held," and "like kind" requirements. It is an insufficient analysis of
the requirements of section 1031 to determine only whether in a
broad sense there is continuity of interest. The specific require-
ments of the statute must be met. Continuity of investment under
section 1031 is not the same as continuity of investment under sec-
tion 333 or other nonrecognition sections; the specific requirements
of section 1031(a) establish the difference. The Tax Court in
Bolker never specifically addressed those requirements. Given this
construction of the Tax Court's opinion, the error is clear.
A second way to construe the Tax Court's alternative holding
is to assume that the court did consider the "holding" requirement
of section 1031(a) and concluded that it had been satisfied by the
continuity of Bolker's investment under section 333. But that posi-
tion would be equally unsound because, implicit in such a position,
is the notice that the holding by the corporation can be attributed
to Bolker. That is, because of his shareholder status, Bolker really
owned the exchange property all along and would have therefore
satisfied the "holding" requirement.
The attribution rationale, however, is also a recognition that
147. Bolker, 81 T.C. at 805.
148. Id. at 805-06.
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there must be a history of holding of the property given up for
there to be an effective section 1031 exchange. " 'O Otherwise, there
would be no need for the Tax Court to be concerned with Bolker's
ownership interest in the corporation. If even a momentary holding
of property were sufficient to satisfy the "holding" requirement, no
reason whatsoever would have existed for the court to discuss con-
tinuity of investment. What is troubling about the attribution ra-
tionale is not only its inconsistency with the previously discussed
non-attribution rule of Regals150 and Revenue Rulings 77-33715
and 75-292 12 but also the absence of any statutory basis for it.
Given the refusal of courts generally to find an identity between a
shareholder and the corporation in which the shareholder owns
stock, the recognition of attribution for section 1031 purposes
would represent an unexplained and very doubtful divergence from
prior law. Furthermore, recognition of attribution may have a sig-
nificant impact on the rule developed in pre-Bolker and Magneson
cases and rulings denying section 1031 nonrecognition in prear-
rangement situations. If attribution is permitted, then prearrange-
ments in certain situations may not be a problem at all. Thus, the
prearranged sale in Bolker was not a bar to section 1031 treatment
because through attribution the holding by the corporation was
considered holding by Bolker.
Regardless of which interpretation of the holding in Bolker is
accepted, the Tax Court appears to be in error. At the very least,
the decision is confusing, suggesting the court's uncertainty in in-
terpreting and applying section 1031.
Although it is unclear whether the Tax Court specifically con-
sidered the "holding" requirement or instead ignored the specific
statutory language and stressed only the need for general con-
tinuity of interest, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Bolker undoubt-
edly focuses on the right question-whether the property given up
had been "held" for investment. Its answer, however, that the in-
tent to exchange property for like-kind property satisfies the hold-
ing requirement, represents an unwarranted expansion of the
statute.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 96-118.
150. Regals Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 194 (1940), aff'd, 127 F.2d 931 (2d
Cir. 1942).
151. Rev. Rul. 337, 1977-2 C.B. 305.
152. Rev. Rul. 292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
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The Ninth Circuit recognized the uniqueness of the issue,
commenting that "authority on [the] issue is scarce.' 1 53 In support
of the Service's position on appeal, the Commissioner cited Reve-
nue Rulings 77-337 and 77-297.15 The Ninth Circuit, however, re-
fused to rely on either ruling, noting that revenue rulings are not
controlling authority and concluding that the rulings cited were
distinguishable. 155 As previously discussed, Revenue Ruling 77-297
involved a situation in which B, who wanted to acquire A's ranch,
purchased another ranch from C to give promptly to A in exchange
for A's ranch. 156 In Revenue Ruling 77-337, a corporation solely
owned by the taxpayer was liquidated under section 333.157 A
shopping center, the sole asset of the corporation, was distributed
to the taxpayer who, pursuant to a prearranged plan, immediately
exchanged it for like-kind property.'58 The rulings denied section
1031 treatment both to B and to the corporate shareholder.
The Ninth Circuit in Bolker distinguished both revenue rul-
ings on the grounds that the liquidation of Bolker's corporation
was planned before Bolker's intention to exchange the property
arose and that Bolker actually held the property received in liqui-
dation for three months prior to the exchange. 15 9 Given the facts of
Bolker, the Ninth Circuit's reasons for finding the revenue rulings
distinguishable seem flimsy indeed. Although Bolker held the
property received from the corporation for three months before the
exchange was consumated, prior to the formal commencement of
the section 333 liquidation negotiations with the bank for the sale
of the properties had reached the point where the bank had agreed
to purchase the property on terms apparently acceptable to the
taxpayer. 60 Only after this agreement was reached was the tax-
payer's corporation liquidated.' 6 ' Under these circumstances, there
is apparently no significant difference between the revenue rulings
and Bolker.
That a liquidation was intended before the agreement with the
153. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1043.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Rev. Rul. 297, 1977-2 C.B. 304. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
157. Rev. Rul. 337, 1977-2 C.B. 305.
158. Id.
159. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1043.
160. Bolker, 81 T.C. at 790.
161. Id.
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bank had been reached also appears a weak basis upon which to
distinguish the revenue rulings. That Bolker had been advised to
liquidate the corporation in order to develop the property does not
change the fact that the corporation was liquidated only after the
exchange agreement with the bank had been reached. There had,
moreover, been a long term pattern of negotiations with the bank
prior to any advice regarding liquidation. 162 In light of these facts,
reliance on any "pre-existing" intention to liquidate seems a weak
basis upon which to distinguish Bolker from the revenue rulings.
Rather than merely distinguishing the revenue rulings, the Ninth
Circuit, without specifically stating so, appears to have found the
revenue rulings to be incorrect interpretations of the section 1031
holding requirement.'6"
In rejecting Revenue Rulings 77-297 and 77-337 as inapplica-
ble, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Bolker that 124 Front Street
and Rutherford provided some support for his position."" As pre-
viously noted, the taxpayer in 124 Front Street owned an option to
buy property which Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. wanted. 6 5 The
taxpayer preferred an exchange of properties to an outright sale,
and Fireman's Fund advanced funds to the taxpayer so that he
could exercise the option. Fireman's Fund then acquired like-kind
property which it exchanged with the taxpayer. The Tax Court
never addressed the "holding" requirement specifically; necessarily
implicit in its decision, however, is the determination that the
"holding" requirement of section 1031 was satisfied by the tax-
payer. The Ninth Circuit, in finding support for Bolker in this de-
cision, apparently relied on the facts that the taxpayer both negoti-
ated the exchange with Fireman's Fund before exercising the
option and held the property for only a short period of time be-
tween the exercise of the option and the exchange of properties.
This short holding of the property after the agreement to exchange
162. Id. at 782-90.
163. It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit does give some weight to Bolker's three-
month personal holding of the property. See Bolker 760 F.2d at 1043-44. At first glance the
opinion may be interpreted as affirming the principle that the holding requirement of sec-
tion 1031 incorporates some notion of a history of use or holding. That reading of the Ninth
Circuit's decision, however, is doubtful considering that the Ninth Circuit's definition of the
"holding" requirement can be construed as negating any need for a history of holding.
164. Id. at 1043-44.
165. 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6, 16 (1975). See supra notes 107-
08 and accompanying text.
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did not negate a section 1031 exchange in 124 Front Street. The
Ninth Circuit concluded therefore that "[e]ven without an explicit
holding . . . the case does support Bolker's theory that an intent
to exchange for like-kind property satisfies the holding
requirement. '"166
In reality, 124 Front Street should not provide Bolker with
much support. Arguably, the option in 124 Front Street repre-
sented an interest of the taxpayer in the property which could ap-
propriately be considered in determining whether the taxpayer had
satisfied the "holding" requirement. Because an exchange of a
thirty year leasehold in realty for a fee interest in realty is consid-
ered a like-kind exchange, 67 it is not unreasonable to assume that
an option to purchase real property may be considered like-kind
property for the purpose of a realty exchange. If the option has
been held for investment purposes, section 1031 should be applica-
ble to such an exchange. Thus, perhaps it is more accurate to char-
acterize 124 Front Street as raising a "like-kind issue"-in which
real property has always received liberal treatment-instead of a
"holding issue."
Rutherford similarly provides very little support for Bolker. In
Rutherford,'6 8 a memorandum decision, the Tax Court never spe-
cifically considered the "holding" requirement of section 1031, and
it appears that the court and not the parties raised the issue of the
applicability of section 1031.111 Rutherford, in sum, does not pro-
vide precedent regarding the holding issue on which one would
want to rely.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that though Bolker was sup-
ported by the two decisions, neither decision explicitly addressed
the holding issue. 170 The Court therefore looked to the "plain lan-
guage" of section 1031, interpreting it as follows: "[A] taxpayer
may satisfy the 'holding' requirement by owning the property, and
the 'for productive use in trade or business or for investment' re-
quirement by lack of intent either to liquidate the investment or to
use it for personal pursuits.'' Echoing the Tax Court's treatment
166. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1044.
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c), T.D. 6935, 32 F.R. 15822.
168. Rutherford v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77 (1978).
169. Id. at 1851-78, 79.
170. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1044.
171. Id. at 1045.
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of the issue, the Ninth Circuit added that "[t]hese are essentially
the two requirements courts have placed on the property acquired
in a section 1031(a) exchange . . . so this interpretation would
yield the symmetry the use of identical language seems to de-
mand. ' 17 2 The court viewed the Commissioner's position, which re-
quired that at some point there be an intent to keep the first piece
of property indefinitely, as one which would improperly add an ad-
ditional requirement to the statute.173
The Ninth Circuit summarized its position by stating "the in-
tent to exchange property for like-kind property satisfies the hold-
ing requirement because it is not an intent to liquidate the invest-
ment or to use it for personal pursuits.' ' 7 4 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
in effect stated it does not matter how one acquired the property
or how long one held the property if the taxpayer owns the prop-
erty and intends to exchange it for like-kind property. As demon-
strated by the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Bolker, the fact that
property is acquired with the intent to exchange it immediately for
other business or investment property will not negate section
1031's application. The Ninth Circuit thus appears to take the po-
sition that there need be no history of holding, that is, no showing
that the taxpayer either used the property over time in a business
or for investment or that the taxpayer held the property for a pe-
riod of time with an intention to use it in his business or for in-
vestment.17 5 Simply stated, according to the Ninth Circuit, an "in-
tent to exchange" is an intent to hold. 7 6
The Ninth Circuit commented that the Commissioner was at-
tempting to read something into the statute by requiring that the
taxpayer have had an intent to hold the property given in ex-
change for an indefinite period of time. 7 7 The Commissioner, how-
ever, in light of the Ninth Circuit's definition of the "holding" re-
quirement may, with some justification, ask whether it is he who is
reading something into the statute or the Ninth Circuit which is




175. The Ninth Circuit in Bolker suggests that time of holding might be important
when it notes that Bolker held the property three months before exchanging it. Id. at 1043.
176. Id. at 1045.
177. Id.
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cuit's definition of the "holding" requirement negated any need on
the part of that court to consider, as the Tax Court may have,
whether the holding of the corporation could be attributed to the
shareholder Bolker in order to assist him in satisfying the "hold-
ing" requirement. The Ninth Circuit's position, like that of the
Tax Court, severely undercuts prior case law and revenue rulings
denying section 1031 nonrecognition treatment in prearrangement
situations. Thus, even though Bolker was already committed to ex-
change the property he acquired from the corporation, the "hold-
ing" requirement was satisfied.
The problems associated with the Ninth Circuit's definition of
the "holding" requirement can be demonstrated with a simple ex-
ample. Assume that A gives to B A's personal residence which A
has held for a number of years. B knows in advance that the resi-
dence is to be given to him, and makes arrangements to exchange
the residence for like-kind property which B will hold for invest-
ment purposes. Immediately after receiving title to the residence,
B exchanges it with C for investment property.
Consistent with its reasoning in Bolker, the Ninth Circuit
could be expected to say that B satisfied the holding requirement
by establishing that B held title to A's residence and proving that
B did not have the intent either to liquidate the investment or to
use it for personal pursuits. Presumably, B can establish both
points. Consequently, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Bolker, one would expect B to be accorded nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 1031, a result that does violence to the lan-
guage of the statute. B, who has prearranged to exchange the prop-
erty to be given to him by A, receives title knowing that his
holding of the gift property will be transitory. The restricted na-
ture of B's holding (whether the prearranged exchange is binding
or nonbinding) apparently would not concern the Ninth Circuit.
To establish the intent necessary to prove compliance with the
holding requirement, the Ninth Circuit looks to the property re-
ceived in the exchange and how it is held. The court, therefore,
melds the "holding" requirement and the "to be held" require-
ment. Under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the "holding" require-
ment of section 1031 is almost devoid of substance. That Congress
never intended this result seems apparent from the "plain lan-
guage" of section 1031.
As the above hypothetical suggests, the Ninth Circuit, through
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its definition of the "holding" requirement, would grant nonrecog-
nition treatment even though the taxpayer was exchanging prop-
erty, which had been used for personal purposes, for property to be
held for investment purposes. This result is inconsistent with the
continuity of investment standard specifically delineated in section
1031(a). To the extent that the Ninth Circuit recognizes any need
for continuity of investment under section 1031, it is a continuity
of investment no different from that required under other nonrec-
ognition provisions such as those of sections 333 and 351.178 Thus,
in their Bolker opinions, the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court
reach essentially the same conclusion regarding continuity of in-
vestment under section 1031, albeit by different paths-the Ninth
Circuit by significantly diluting the meaning of the "holding" re-
quirement and the Tax Court by disregarding the specific language
of section 1031(a). Hypotheticals 1 and 2 at the beginning of this
Article indicate that Congress imposed continuity of investment
requirements in section 1031 substantially different from those of
section 351 and other nonrecognition provisions. The reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court is inconsistent with the con-
gressional intent manifested in the plain language of section
1031.179
In Bolker-type cases in the future, the Commissioner may seek
to apply the step transaction doctrine, which if applicable, would
characterize a Bolker-type transaction as an exchange of stock for
property. 80 As such, the exchange would not only fail to meet the
"like-kind" requirement of the statute, but it would also involve a
prohibited type of property-stock-in the exchange. It is, however,
not certain that the Commissioner will be able to apply the doc-
trine to Bolker-type exchanges. If the step transaction doctrine is
applied in Bolker settings, it may be applied in the opposite direc-
tion, to a property-for-property exchange, followed by an exchange
178. See I.R.C. §§ 333, 351 (1985).
179. As the Ninth Circuit notes, "in almost all fact situations in which property is ac-
quired for immediate exchange, there is no gain or loss to the acquiring taxpayer on the
exchange if the property has not had time to change in value. Therefore, it is irrelevant to
that taxpayer whether section 1031(a) applies." Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039,
1043 (9th Cir. 1985). While the significance of the decision in this regard may be limited, in
the case of shareholders and corporations, the Ninth Circuit's decision offers substantial
planning opportunities.
180. In Bolker, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider the matter for the first time on
appeal. Id. at 1042.
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of the acquired property for corporate stock in a section 351 trans-
action. If so, the whole transaction could be collapsed to a nontax-
able section 351 exchange, seriously undercutting the Service's
contention in Revenue Ruling 75-292 that the property-for-prop-
erty exchange is taxable because the prompt disposition of the ac-
quired property takes the exchange outside section 1031.181 In any
event, the Bolker holding on the intent required under section
1031 remains in force regardless of any future role for the step-
transaction doctrine.
B. Magneson and the To Be Held Requirement
1. The Tax Court and Ninth Circuit Decisions
The taxpayers in Magneson'812 were the owners in fee simple of
real property and an apartment building on Iowa Street in San Di-
ego ("Iowa Street property"). 83 On August 11, 1977, in a prear-
ranged transaction, they transferred their fee interest in the Iowa
Street property to N.E.R. Plaza, Ltd., a California limited partner-
ship, in exchange for a ten percent undivided interest in certain
commercial real property known as the Plaza Property. Immedi-
ately thereafter, on the same day, the taxpayers contributed their
undivided interest in the Plaza Property, along with some cash, to
U.S. Trust, Ltd., also a California limited partnership. In return,
the taxpayers received a ten percent general partnership interest in
U.S. Trust. The remaining ninety percent undivided interest in the
Plaza Property was acquired by U.S. Trust the same day. The
Magnesons claimed their entire transaction was tax-free under sec-
tions 1031(a) and 721.184
Section 721 provides for nonrecognition of gain on the contri-
bution of property to a partnership in exchange for an interest
therein.185 The parties agreed that section 721 applied to the
Magnesons' contribution to U.S. Trust of their tenancy in common
in Plaza Property.'86 They also agreed that the Iowa Street prop-
erty and the Plaza Property were like-kind, and that the former
181. Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
182. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, afl'd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
183. Id. at 768.
184. Id. at 767-68.
185. I.R.C. § 721 (1985).
186. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 768.
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had been held for productive use in a trade or business or for in-
vestment. The Commissioner, however, asserted that section
1031(a) did not apply to the taxpayers' Iowa Street property-Plaza
Property exchange on the ground that the taxpayers did not hold
the Plaza Property for productive use or for investment.18 As the
Ninth Circuit noted, there was "no precedent on point at either
the Tax Court or the circuit court level.' 8 8
In a reviewed opinion, the Inajority of the Tax Court in
Magneson determined that the issue was whether the contribution
to the partnership "was a liquidation of [taxpayers'] investment or
a continuation of the old investment in a modified form."' 89 The
majority concluded, "joint ownership of the property [as owners of
an undivided interest as tenants in common] and partnership own-
ership of the property are merely formal differences and not sub-
stantial differences . . . and [taxpayers] did not liquidate their in-
vestment in [the acquired] Plaza Property when they contributed
it to U.S. Trust."'190 The taxpayers thus prevailed.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, claiming that the
tenancy in common and the partnership interest were not like-kind
and were separated by more than "merely formal differences," as-
serted that section 1031 could only be satisfied if the taxpayers
held the tenancy in common for productive use or investment.' 9'
The dissent concluded that a holding for immediate subsequent
exchange did not qualify, at least when the property received in
the subsequent exchange was not like-kind. 92
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, but its decision, as
in Bolker, rested on a different rationale. According to the Ninth
Circuit, it was not sufficient to find that the taxpayers had contin-
ued their investment." s Rather, as the court would later explain in
Bolker, "we based affirmance [in Magneson] on our holding that
the Magnesons intended to and did continue to hold the acquired
property, the contribution to the partnership being a change in the
form of ownership rather than the relinquishment of
187. Id. at 769.
188. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1493.
189. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 771.
190. Id. at 773.
191. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 778-79 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 779-80 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
193. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1496-97.
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ownership." ''
The Ninth Circuit specifically limited its holding in Magneson
to situations in which the partnership interest acquired is a general
partnership interest, "the purpose of the partnership is to hold the
property for investment," and the partnership's total assets are
"predominantly of like-kind to the taxpayers' original
investment. 1 95
The crux of the matter with respect to the property acquired
in a putative section 1031 exchange is the taxpayer's intent at the
time of the exchange; the taxpayer must acquire the property with
the intent to hold it for productive use or investment. The parties
in Magneson stipulated that at the time of the exchange the tax-
payers intended to hold the acquired property for contribution to
the partnership, and resolution of the case thus turned on whether
such an intent satisfied the statute.196
2. Analysis
The analyses of both the Tax Court majority and the Ninth
Circuit are questionable. As in Bolker, the Tax Court focused ex-
clusively on the continuity of investment rationale underlying sec-
tion 1031 but failed to discuss the specific requirements of the pro-
vision. 197 The "to be held" requirement, instead of being treated as
a separate requirement of the continuity of investment principle,
was merged within it. The majority ignored the statutory require-
ment that the property received be held for productive use or in-
vestment and instead examined the characteristics of section 721
transactions-carryover of basis, tacking of holding period, and ab-
sence of recapture-that exemplify the continuity of investment
rationale underlying section 721.1"8 The majority also examined
certain characteristics of partnership tax law that reflect a close
relationship to taxation of individuals outside partnerships: resto-
ration of the status quo ante had U.S. Trust liquidated before dis-
posing of Plaza Property, the similarity of tax consequences be-
tween the sale of the Plaza Property by the partnership or the sale
194. Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 1985).
195. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1498.
196. Id. at 1493.
197. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 767-74.
198. Id. at 771-74. See I.R.C. § 721 (1985).
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by the former tenants in common, and the possibility that co-own-
ers of property may be taxed as partners in some circumstances.199
All this was done as if the crucial question concerned the oper-
ations of subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code instead of
section 1031. As the dissent noted, the recitation of the "ancillary
tax-free consequences" of section 721 transactions was irrelevant
to the issue presented;200 one might say the same regarding the dis-
cussion of other characteristics of partnership taxation. What is
particularly troubling is that the majority identified both the sali-
ent fact-the taxpayers held the acquired property for the purpose
of contributing it to the partnership-and the critical is-
sue-whether such holding qualifies for holding as an investment.
But to resolve the issue without further reference to the taxpayers'
intent and the "to be held" requirement undermines the statute.
To look simply to the consequences of the of the subsequent dispo-
sition is to substitute an alternative nonrecognition rule for the one
provided in section 1031. The consequences of the application of
section 721 may be found equally in section 351 transactions, and
as the dissent pointed out, the majority's opinion, despite its ex-
plicit reservation of the issue, suggests that like-kind exchanges
followed by a prearranged section 351 exchange will qualify under
the Magneson rationale.0 1
The Tax Court opinion in Magneson, like its later opinion in
Bolker, is susceptible of two interpretations. First, section 1031 is
satisfied if the taxpayer establishes that there is continuity of in-
vestment, that is, if the taxpayer has not liquidated his investment
but rather continues an old investment in a modified form. As pre-
viously noted, this rationale in effect ignores the specific language
of section 1031(a) and emphasizes the broad continuity of interest
rationale underlying section 1031.
Second, the "to be held" requirement may be satisfied by
showing that there is an identity of interest between the taxpayer's
holding of the property received in the exchange and the holding
of a related party to whom the taxpayer transferred the property
subsequent to its acquisition. The Tax Court's emphasis on the na-
ture of the Magnesons' partnership interest and its conclusion that
199. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 773.
200. Id. at 780 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 773 n.5.
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"joint ownership of the property and partnership ownership of the
property are merely formal differences and not substantial differ-
ences" 20 2 confirm that the Tax Court believed the holding by the
partnership should be attributed to the Magnesons. Thus, the fact
that the partnership held the property for investment established
the Magnesons had acquired the property with the intent to hold
it for investment. The attribution rationale supported by both the
Magneson and Bolker decisions of the Tax Court represents a de-
cided shift from prior law and adds a questionable gloss to the lan-
guage of section 1031. Under either the broad continuity of interest
or the attribution rationale, the Tax Court treats statutory lan-
guage with a certain indifference suggesting it is more interested in
a result that comports with its sense of tax justice rather than with
the specific congressional standard.
Given its emphasis on continuity of interest, the Tax Court
never had to consider whether the short term holding by the
Magnesons alone was sufficient to satisfy the "to be held" require-
ment. In his dissent, Judge Tannenwald considered whether that
short term holding was sufficient to satisfy the requirement.20 3 Be-
cause the tenancy in common interest received by the taxpayer in
the exchange was not like-kind to the partnership interest subse-
quently acquired, Judge Tannenwald concluded the "to be held"
requirement was not satisfied. 04 The taxpayers' holding of the ten-
ancy in common interest was simply too brief to establish the nec-
essary intent to hold the property. Judge Tannenwald took no po-
sition regarding the results which might be expected if the tenancy
in common and the partnership had been like-kind. In a footnote,
however, he recognized that though it generally had not addressed
the "to be held" requirement, "Congress was concerned that such
requirement not be broadly applied. 21 0 5 His bias against attribu-
tion of the sort found in the majority decision in Magneson is sug-
gested by his characterization of the possible cases where attribu-
tion might be permissible as "exceptional. 20 6
202. Id. at 773.
203. Id. at 780-82 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 779-80 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 780 n.7 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
206. Id. Tannenwald's suggestion in dictum that there may be some relationship be-
tween the "like-kind" requirement and the "to be held" requirement should be rejected.
That property received in an exchange is immediately exchanged for other like-kind prop-
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Intertwined in the Magneson fact pattern are the "to be held"
issue and the related question of whether the "like kind" require-
ment of the statute was satisfied. Although the Tax Court majority
essentially assumed there was no like-kind question, both the dis-
sent and the Ninth Circuit found it necessary to review the appli-
cable California law on fee interests, tenancy in common, and ten-
ancy in partnership. 2 7 The dissenting Tax Court opinion
concluded that the differences between tenancies in partnership
and the other forms of ownership were too significant to qualify as
like-kind. 208 As noted above, it then looked to the holding issue
only to ask-and answer negatively-whether the ephemeral hold-
ing of the tenancy in common was sufficient, given a like-kind ex-
change of the fee interest for the tenancy in common.20 9 The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, not only viewed the differences as "not
dispositive," but also considered them as related to the holding for
investment issue, not the like-kind issue.210 The message the Ninth
Circuit drew from local law was that tenants in common and gen-
eral partners (as opposed to limited partners) had the "same na-
ture" of control over property.211 The Ninth Circuit concluded: "If
at the time of the exchange, as here, the taxpayer intends to con-
tribute the property to a partnership for a general partnership in-
terest, and the partnership's purpose is to hold the property for
investment, the holding requirement of section 1031(a) is
satisfied. 212
In Bolker, the Ninth Circuit had held that the intent to ex-
change property for like-kind property was equivalent to holding
the property.218 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Magneson thus
provided a similarly novel interpretation of the "to be held" re-
quirement: an intent to give up property ("to contribute" it) is an
intent to hold it, but only if the entity receiving it intends to hold
erty should be irrelevant in determining whether the "to be held" requirement has been met
with respect to the first exchange. The focus of section 1031 is on the property received in
the exchange. Congress was not likely to have contemplated a series of exchanges such as
presented in Magneson.
207. Id. at 774-82 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting), aff'd, 753 F.2d at 1495.
208. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 777-78 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 778-82.
210. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1496.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1983).
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it and only if the transferor receives a general partnership inter-
est.21 How one determines the intent of the partnership is not dis-
cussed. Partnership intent is determined for other purposes, of
course, so it can undoubtedly be determined here; however, there
is the need to determine that intent at a precise moment, the time
of the exchange. Interpreting this new partnership intent require-
ment is more speculative if the partnership itself promptly dis-
poses of the property, perhaps to a related partnership or in a like-
kind exchange of its own.
There is an appealing analogy behind the convoluted reading
of the statutory language that the property received "be held" for
investment. General partners, tenants in common, and fee owners
do have much in common. Thus, the Ninth Circuit apparently
finds it a mere technicality that the partnership and not the tax-
payer holds the property,215 an unduly narrow construction of sec-
tion 1031. The taxpayers continue to "own" the property as part-
ners under local law, and the property continues to be held for
investment. The Ninth Circuit holding, moreover, is not only logi-
cally sound, but carefully limited; in addition to local law "owner-
ship" of property being used for investment, the court requires
both control of a general partner rather than that of a limited
partner and predominantly like-kind assets within the partner-
ship.21 The court is also careful to point out distinctions between
corporations and partnerships that will inhibit the ready applica-
tion of its holding to section 1031-section 351 transactions. 7 The
opinion, in sum, may elaborate very well how section 1031 ought to
read. But it remains unclear whether the statute actually provides
that an intent "to contribute" to a partnership is an intent "to
hold" or that the taxpayer's intent turns on the intent of the part-
nership, the character of its assets, and the type of partnership in-
terest received.
214. Presumably the Ninth Circuit would disqualify a transaction in which a limited
partnership interest was received, even if the transferor were also a pre-existing general
partner. On the other hand, a pre-existing limited partner receiving a general partnership
interest apparently qualifies. In these two apparently differing tax situations, the economic
situations of the taxpayer, when all the dust has settled, are precisely the same.
215. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1496.
216. Id. This latter requirement raises the possibility of manipulation of partnership
assets for a partner's section 1031 purposes. Perhaps manipulation can be detected and be
disqualifying.
217. Id. at 1493-94.
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The Ninth Circuit's Magneson opinion and its later Bolker
opinion, moreover, do not appear to be entirely consistent. In
Bolker the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected any idea that there
was a time requirement implicit in the "holding" requirement.21
The notion that the "taxpayers have, previous to forming the in-
tent to exchange one piece of property for a second parcel, an in-
tent to keep the first piece of property indefinitely" was viewed by
the Ninth Circuit as "an unexpressed additional requirement. '"2 19
As noted, ownership of the property and lack of intent to liquidate
or use it for personal purposes were all the taxpayer needed to
prove to satisfy the "holding" requirement. Thus, transitory own-
ership of property combined with the receipt of investment or bus-
iness property such as that in Bolker is sufficient to satisfy the
holding requirement.
In Magneson, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit seems to suggest
that something more than short term ownership is necessary to
satisfy the "to be held" requirement. Apparently, length of holding
period becomes significant in determining whether the taxpayer
has the requisite intent to satisfy the "to be held" requirement.
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, found it necessary in Magneson to
attribute to the taxpayer/partner the partnership's holding of the
real estate acquired by the taxpayer in the exchange and promptly
contributed by the taxpayer to the partnership.2 0
The Ninth Circuit, in effect, recognized in Magneson both at-
tribution and the significance of the length of holding in determin-
ing whether the "to be held" requirement was satisfied. Magneson
and Bolker, of course, addressed different requirements of section
1031(a); Bolker addressed the "holding" requirement and
Magneson the "to be held" requirement. Comparing Magneson
and Bolker, one might properly conclude that satisfaction of the
"to be held" requirement is more demanding than satisfaction of
the "holding" requirement. That is a curious result indeed. It is
equally curious that, given the attribution rationale of its
Magneson decision and its stress on the continuity of invest-
ment,22 the Ninth Circuit in Bolker did not forego attempting a
218. Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 1985).
219. Id. at 1045.
220. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d at 1496.
221. The Ninth Circuit in Magneson noted that the "crucial question in a section
1031(a) analysis is continuity of investment in like-kind property." Id. at 1495-96.
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definition of holding and simply consider, as it did in Magneson,
whether there could be attribution to Bolker of the corporation's
holding of the property.
In Magneson, it should be noted that the Commissioner, in
addition to raising the "to be held" issue, alternatively argued that
the Magnesons' exchange should be viewed under the step transac-
tion doctrine as a non-like-kind exchange of a fee interest for a
partnership interest.222 The court found it unclear that a more di-
rect route could have been taken than the one taken by the tax-
payers and that it might, therefore, be inappropriate to apply the
step transaction doctrine.223 The court, however, went on to add
that the transaction qualified under section 1031(a) even with the
application of the step transaction doctrine, based on its finding
that the fee interest (or tenancy in common) and the general part-
nership interest were in fact like-kind with respect to the critical
factors of management and control.224 In this respect, the
Magneson transaction was held to be fundamentally distinguisha-
ble from the exchange of a general partnership interest for a lim-
ited partnership interest, an exchange held not to be like-kind in
Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner2 25 "based on the change in the
taxpayers' ability [as a limited partner compared to a general part-
ner] to manage and control the property. ' 26 The court did not dis-
cuss the possibility that application of the step transaction doc-
trine would make section 1031 irrelevant in Magneson-type
settings, collapsing the entire transaction into a nontaxable section
721 exchange, a result the Internal Revenue Service would hardly
welcome.
III. PROPOSAL
The nonrecognition rule of section 1031(a) has been around a
long time, producing on occasion what some observers have re-
222. Id. at 1497.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974), af'g 58 T.C. 311 (1972).
226. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d at 1498. The court acknowledged in a foot-
note that "for transactions executed after July 18, 1984, Congress has amended section
1031(a) to exclude the exchange of partnership interests," thus at least raising the prospect
that the application of the step transaction doctrine under present law would result in deci-
sion for the Commissioner. Id. at 1497 n.4.
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garded as bizarre, inequitable results. Such results have prompted
several proposals for fundamental revision of the provision,227 and
there appears to be no need to add yet another to the list. If the
essential elements of the current rule remain unchanged, the most
appropriate "proposal," such as it is, is far more modest: interpret
the statute according to its plain meaning.
What emerges clearly from the opinions of the Tax Court and
the Ninth Circuit in Bolker and Magneson is a desire to interpret
section 1031(a) in such a way as to rectify perceived inequities in
the statute. The Tax Court equates the continuity of investment
rationale underlying section 1031 with that underlying a host of
other nonrecognition provisions and suggests that compliance with
this ubiquitous, amorphous standard is all that matters. The Ninth
Circuit is careful not to go so far; it attaches great significance to
continuity of investment, but it adds explicitly that the taxpayer
must also satisfy the specific requirements of section 1031. None-
theless, the importance the Ninth Circuit gives to continuity of in-
vestment can be seen in its conclusions. There is a reach to find
that the specific requirements have been met and a failure to rec-
ognize that the specific requirements impose a continuity of invest-
ment principle not identical to that found elsewhere in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. Although the rationales of the two courts, as
the Ninth Circuit says in Bolker, may be different, the message
seems to be the same: its tax consequences when there has been no
genuine liquidation of the taxpayer's investment and no conversion
of that investment to personal use, and section 1031 should be read
in a way that carries out that philosophy. The two courts may have
followed different routes, but their goals are much the same.
Both courts, in fact, articulate their rationales with considera-
ble logical appeal. Their common problem, however, is that they
seem inconsistent with the language of section 1031 and the con-
gressional purpose behind it, which was set forth in 1934 when re-
peal of the statute was considered and rejected. In the absence of
statutory revision, the section should be read as essentially provid-
ing a limited exception to the recognition principle for taxpayers
who establish a continuity of investment meeting the unique three-
227. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 8, at 92-94; Comment, Tax-Free Exchanges of Like
Kind Investment or Business Property: A Proposal for Legislative Revision of Internal
Revenue Code Section 1031, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 375-86 (1979).
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prong test of section 1031: property held for productive use or in-
vestment, exchanged for like-kind property, to be held for produc-
tive use or investment. The like-kind aspect has been explored ex-
tensively elsewhere and has relatively settled definitions. Much less
well-explored, either in regulations, case law, rulings, or commen-
tary are the "holding" and the "to be held" requirements; their
definitions should not be settled by Bolker and Magneson.
The section 1031 holding requirements should instead be
given their plain meaning; plain meaning and congressional intent
are not always synonomous, but in this instance the plain meaning
of the holding requirements is indeed consistent with legislative
purpose. The two holding requirements focus on the two parcels of
property that are exchanged and not on any prior or later substi-
tuted property. Each exchanged property must satisfy the "hold-
ing" or "to be held" requirement on its own. A prearranged and
immediate series of like-kind exchanges, for example, does not
warrant nonrecognition treatment simply because the first prop-
erty in the series was held for investment and the last is intended
to be so held. There is nothing to indicate that Congress contem-
plated nonrecognition for such exchanges; the statute on its face
does not grant nonrecognition, and there is simply no justification
for reading section 1031 so expansively.
There is, to be sure, a decided breadth to the limits of the
term "like-kind" with respect to real property. Such breadth, how-
ever, seems inherent in the phrase itself and in the underlying pur-
pose of the statute. Excesses, if any, are somewhat less destructive
of the statute. There is also, perhaps, a certain liberality in permit-
ting investment property to be exchanged for "like-kind" business
property and vice versa; it is more accurate, however, to say that
such exchanges are what the statute precisely authorizes. Section
1031 simply declines to make a distinction between business and
investment use, for both are nonpersonal, and neither represents a
cashing in of the investment.
It is sometimes asserted, nonetheless, that section 1031 is to
receive a liberal construction, but recent legislation belies the as-
sertion today. Section 1031 has long been strictly construed for dis-
qualification where cash has passed through the taxpayer's hands,
however brief the passage.2 2 8 Moreover, two of the most notorious
228. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241-43 (5th Cir. 1967).
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pro-taxpayer strategies of recent years were sharply curtailed in
the Tax Reform Act of 1984.129 The anti-Starker 230 provisions of
section 1031(a)(3) require the identification and exchange, within
prescribed time limits, of the property to be received; the provi-
sions of new section 1031(a)(2)(D) overrule a line of cases permit-
ting exchanges of certain types of partnership interests to qualify
for nonrecognition treatment.3 1 In both instances, Congress was
reacting to judicial broadening of the statute, and there is simply
no reason to assume that a loosening of the holding requirements
comports with congressional intent, in 1934 or today.
The courts, should, therefore uphold the Internal Revenue
Service in its position that property "held" for productive use or
investment connotes a holding of that property for some reasona-
ble period of time and that property "to be held" connotes an in-
tent at the time of the exchange to hold the acquired property for
some reasonable period of time. To set forth a minimum time re-
quirement, however, would be to read into the statute what is not
there. The time aspect of the holding periods must be determined
on a case by case, facts and circumstances basis, giving due regard,
for example, to whether the length of time involved allows either
market forces to impact investment proeprty or a trade or business
to make meaningful use of business property.
Section 1031, as noted, focuses only on the two parcels of
property exchanged, not on prior or later substituted property. It
also focuses on one taxpayer and what that taxpayer does and in-
tends to do with property, not on what some other taxpayer does
or intends to do. For federal income tax purposes, corporations,
partnerships, and trusts are generally regarded as entities separate
from the individual who has an interest therein. These entities
should not be viewed as mere extensions of those individuals for
purposes of section 1031. Because section 1031 incorporates no re-
lated party exceptions, transfers to or from a related corporation,
229. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 77, 98 Stat. 474, 595 (1983).
230. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). See H.R. REP. No. 432,
98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1232.
231. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1234; S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 244. Several cases permitted exchanges of partnership interests under section 1031(a)
where the underlying assets of the partnerships were substantially similar in nature. E.g.,
Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 556, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1974), af'g 58 T.C. 311
(1972); Gulfstream Land and Development Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587, 591-96 (1979).
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partnership, non-grantor trust, or related individual should be
treated as transfers to or from unrelated parties. If such a transfer
would violate one of the holding requirements, the relationship
should not save it, at least -in the absence of legislative change. Be-
cause a transfer to a grantor trust is, in essence, treated as an in-
complete transfer for tax purposes generally, 2  a similar view of
grantor trusts is appropriate for section 1031 purposes. Transfers
to or from spouses, children, wholly-owned corporations, controlled
partnerships, and the like, however, are ordinarily given effect for
tax purposes, at least in the absence of specific legislative direction
to the contrary. The same rule is appropriate for section 1031
transfers. If dominion and control have been passed for tax pur-
poses in general, section 1031 should not be read as including its
own standard of "continuing ownership." Thus, giving effect to the
plain meaning of section 1031(a) would result in the following con-
clusions. First, the exchange in Magneson was not within the stat-
ute because the property received was not to be held by the tax-
payer but was to be contributed to a partnership. Second, the
exchange in Bolker was taxable because the property given up had
been held by the taxpayer not for productive use or investment but
only for exchange.
If these results are unsatisfactory, they flow from the fact that
section 1031 imposes its own unique continuity of investment stan-
dard, and the remedy for that lies with Congress. But it is not at
all clear that the results are unsatisfactory. Congress may reasona-
bly have determined that repeated exchanges suggest a liquidity
not to be shielded from current taxation by section 1031 or that
transmutation of ownership to corporate or partnership form per-
mits a diversification that should also not be protected. It is pre-
sumably possible to confine Magneson and Bolker to their special-
ized facts-a sole shareholder in Bolker, a two-partner partnership
in Magneson-and thus to give them a narrow reading, narrower
even than that attempted by the Ninth Circuit in Magneson.
There is, however, no certainty that the decisions will be so
confined.
In any event, the boundary lines drawn by Congress should
not be redrawn by the others. Section 1031 nonrecognition is lim-
ited to the one taxpayer and to the two parcels of property that
232. See I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (1985).
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taxpayer exchanged. Congress has typically imposed limits on non-
recognition transactions. Perhaps inevitably, aspects of the limits
appear somewhat arbitrary, and exceptions at the margins may
often seem appropriate. But line drawing is nonetheless done, and
certainty in some aspects has its virtues. Bolker and Magneson
open up nonrecognition to transactions that section 1031 on its
face does not encompass. The decisions decrease certainty and en-
courage aggressive planning within uncertain boundaries. If the
limitations of section 1031 are troubling at times, it is a character-
istic shared with other nonrecognition provisions. Whether the
remedy, if any remedy at all is warranted, is to broaden or narrow
the limits, and to what extent, should be left to Congress.
